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and the victim's obligation is transferred to this same third party. Nothing
more in the way of money or tangible property has moved from the victim
after this transaction than had gone before. What demarcation is encountered that would make the defendant's first act (obtaining the note) a mere
civil action and his second act (discounting the note) a criminal offense?
It is submitted that no such demarcation should be found. The only apparent argument is that where a non-negotiable instrument is involved, the
victim's obligation is voidable and where a negotiable instrument is involved the victim may lose the right to avoid the obligation. But it would
seem that the state, when it expressly provided that an evidence of debt
was personal property, desired to punish defendant for wrongfully obtaining the obligation, and not to allow the criminality of defendant's acts to
rest on the victim's decision to avoid or affirm an obligation, or to determine
criminality on the basis of any resulting financial loss to the victim.
It seems but a logical conclusion that where evidences of debt are considered personal property in and of themselves and have been executed and
delivered to the defendant, title and possession of personal property has
passed. The remaining question then, is what intangibles are to be construed as evidences of debt or things in action within the meaning of the
false pretense statute. Caruso holds that contractual obligations may be so
construed.
Conclusion
It would seem advisable that the legislature should consider the merits
of revising the theft statute bringing it into line with provisions of many
other states making it an offense "to obtain, by false pretense, the signature
of any person to any written instrument, the false making of which would
be punished as forgery." This seems particularly desirable because of the
existing ambiguity between California Penal Code, sections 484 and 1110,
and also because of the sparsity of cases construing a contractual obligation
as personal property within the theft statute, none of which have been reviewed by the California Supreme Court.
Richard L. Weatherspoon*
*

Member, Second Year class.

PUBLIC UTILITIES: Dedication of Use As Prerequisite
to Regulation of Oil and Gas Corporation
In Richfield Oil Corporation v. Public Utilities Commission,1 the California Supreme Court had to decide whether the Commission had jurisdiction over the petitioner and thus could regulate its activities. This was the
first time the question of dedication as a prerequisite of public utility regulation had been raised in connection with a gas corporation before the court,
even though such an organization is defined 2 and classified as a public utility3 in the statutes.
154 Cal. 2d -- , 354 P.2d 4, 6 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1960).
2 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 222.

3 CAL. PUB. UTI.. CODE

§ 216.
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In 1959, Southern California Edison Company needed a long term supply of natural gas to use as a fuel for a new generating plant in Ventura
County, California. After the regulated utilities in the area refused to
supply such gas, the petitioner, which had accumulated a large reserve of
gas over and above its own requirement for maintenance of pressure in oil
fields, contracted to sell and deliver the needed supply to Edison for a
period of twenty-five years. In order to deliver the gas, the petitioner had
to build a pipeline from its oilfields to the new plant This pipeline traversed a national forest and it was therefore necessary to secure a right
of way permit from the United States of America, pursuant to section 28
of the Mineral Leasing Act.4 The petitioner applied and received this
permit.
When Southern Counties Gas Company, the certified public utility in
the area, learned of the contract, it filed a complaint against the petitioner
in this case with the Public Utilities Commission. This complaint was based
on section 1001 of the California Public Utilities Code, which stipulates
that a certificate of public convenience and necessity must be acquired
from the Commission before a pipeline can be built by any public utility.
Southern Counties claimed the petitioner had dedicated the pipeline to
public use pursuant to the common carrier clause in the right of way permit secured from the federal government. Southern Counties further claimed
that the petitioner had thereby made itself a public utility subject to the
regulation of the Commission.
In an administrative hearing, the Public Utilities Commission found the
petitioner to be a public utility and ordered it to obtain a certificate of convenience. The petitioner refused, and as a result, the Commission issued
a cease and desist order. After receiving these two orders, the petitioner
appealed to the supreme court.
The court unanimously held that both orders of the Commission be
annulled, handling the question of dedication as it had done in regard to
any other type of utility. The decision can be reduced to four main principles: 1) Dedication is required as a prerequisite of public utility regulation; 2) The petitioner had not dedicated its gas reserves to the public
and therefore was not a public utility; 3) Section 1001 of the Public Utilities
Code applies only to public utilities and, as the petitioner was not a public
utility, it was not required to secure a certificate of convenience; 4) The
right of way permit that the petitioner was required to obtain in order to
cross federal land stipulated that it act as a common carrier. The court
held that although the petitioner did have a common carrier obligation, this
obligation did not subject it to regulation until it was actually called upon
to transport gas to others. Nor did this obligation subject the petitioner's
non-public operation of selling and delivering gas to Edison to regulation.
Dedication-A Consistent Requirement
Dedication, meaning devotion of services or property to the public use,
has been consistently recognized by the courts as a requirement that must
be established before the Commission gains jurisdiction over the corpora441 STAT. 449 (1920) as amended 49
u.s.c. § 185 (1958).

STAT.

678 (1935), 67

STAT.

557 (1953), 30
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tion furnishing such service or property.5 As long as a person or business
uses its property for private purposes only and does not dedicate it to the
public use, the public, even through the Commission, has no interest in it.'
But if the property is dedicated, the public may insist on the right to have
a voice in its regulation and control7 subject to the owner's right to a reasonable profit and return. s This dedication entails regulation ". . . over
rates (Pub. Util. Code, § 728), services (Pub. Util. Code, § 761), construction of plants and extensions thereof (Pub. Util. Code, § 1001), issuance
of securities (Pub. Util. Code, § 816), and the disposing or encumbering
of operative property (Pub. Util. Code, § 851)." 9
Extent of Dedication Necessary
One of the basic issues before the court was to what extent must a
utility dedicate its property to the public use before that utility may be
subjected to the regulation of the Commission under the authority given
it in the state constitution and statutes?"0 The court admitted that if this
had been its first opportunity to interpret the pertinent laws, it would have
serious doubts that the broad language used in these laws included the
limitation of dedication as there was no reference made to dedication
within the code. Dedication had originally been incorporated into the law
to satisfy a constitutional question," but that question is no longer in issue.
However, since the codification of the original Public Utilities Act in 1911,12
the legislature has repeatedly re-enacted the pertinent code sections of 207
and 216, defining "public" and "public utility" in substantially the same
form 13 saying nothing of dedication even in light of judicial interpretation
requiring dedication since 1912. This strongly suggests legislative intent in
accord with the case holdings.
In addition, Public Utilities Code section 704 makes it unlawful for a
14
foreign corporation to carry on the business of a public utility in California.
This would affect most of the oil corporations, including the petitioner,
forcing them out of the state. It must be assumed that the legislature was
aware of this situation. This supports legislative intent to require dedication. If this interpretation is to be changed after forty years of case au5Pajaro Valley Storage Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 54 Cal. 2d -, 352 P.2d 721,
5 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1960); Thayer v. California Dev. Co., 164 Cal. 117, 128 Pac. 21
(1912).
6 Associated Pipeline Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 176 Cal. 518, 169 Pac. 62 (1917).
7 Producer's Transp. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 176 Cal. 499, 169 Pac. 59 (1917);
af'd, 251 U.S. 228 (1919).
s Lyon & Hoag v. Railroad Comm'n, 183 Cal. 145, 190 Pac. 795 (1920).
9 Richfield Oil Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 54 Cal. 2d
,
, 354 P.2d 4, 11,
6 Cal. Rptr. 548, 555 (1960).
10 See CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 23; art. XIV, § 1; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 216, 1001.
"1 Thayer v. California Dev. Co., 164 Cal. 117, 128 Pac. 21 (1912).
12 Cal. Stat. 1911 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, §§ 1-88, pp. 18-64.
"3 Cal. Stat. 1915, ch. 91, § 2(bb), pp. 118-9; Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 707, § 1(bb),
pp. 1333-4; Cal. Stat. 1919, ch. 304, § 1(dd), p. 493; Cal. Stat. 1927, ch. 130, § 1(dd),

pp. 248-9; Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 784 § 1(dd), pp. 2088-9; Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 896, § I(dd),
p. 2478; Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 764, §§ 207, 216(a), pp. 2027, 2029.
14

See Webster Mfg. Co. v. Byrnes, 207 Cal. 630, 280 Pac. 101 (1929).
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thority, it seems that the legislature should take the action rather than the
courts.
It therefore can be seen that this question was not original with this
case, except as it pertained to a gas corporation. The requirement of a
showing of dedication is a matter of settled law. Other states have the
same requirement. 15
In determining whether, in a specific instance, a corporation is a public
utility several factors must be considered. The name "corporation" alone
implies a public use and service to the public. The purpose for which the
corporation was organized 8 and whether the corporation has condemned
property to the public use must be examinedY.1
What Is Dedication?
The primary test of dedication is whether the services have been held
out to the public in general on equal terms.' 8 It need not be to all the
public, but to any limited portion that can be serviced by the corporation
in question. It must be distinguished from being ready to serve only particular individuals, either as accommodation to them or for other reasons
peculiar to them.' 9
In a case similar to Richfield, a water company sold surplus water to
the town of Sausalito under contract. The town then distributed the water
to its inhabitants. The court held that the water company bad not thus
become a public utility, and that a single sale of part of its water was not
a dedication which 0would".., convert the use into a public use in which
others could share.2
It is not the use to which the consumer puts the service or commodity
furnished that determines the character of the furnisher as a public utility,
but the duty the furnisher has undertaken or owes to the publie. 2' As
shown in an Ohio case, no presumption of dedication arises merely because
the services in question are of the nature usually related to public utility
regulation. 22 Certainly a public utility is not immune from the competition
of private business.2 3 Dedication is not a trivial thing and can not be assumed unless there is unequivocal proof of such.24 It has been said, however,
that the necessary evidence may be inferred from the way in which a cor15 Phoenix v. Kasun, 54 Ariz. 470, 97 P.2d 210 (1939); State ex rel Danciger v.

Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Mo. 483, 205 S.W. 36 (1918); Southern Ohio Power Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 110 Ohio St. 246, 143 N.E. 700 (1924).
U See Story v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057 (1921).
Lamb v. California Water & Tel. Co., 21 Cal. 2d 33, 129 P.2d 371 (1942).
18 Allen v. Railroad Comm'n, 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pac. 466 (1918).
19 S. Edwards Associates v. Railroad Comm'n, 196 Cal. 62, 235 Pac. 647 (1925).
20 Marin Water Co. v. Town of Sausalito, 168 Cal. 587, 596, 143 Pac. 767, 771
(1914).
21
Pinney & Boyle v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp., 168 Cal. 12, 141 Pac. 620
(1914).
22 Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 110 Ohio St. 246, 143 N.E.
700 (1924).
23
Commercial Communications v. Public Util. Comn'n, 50 Cal. 2d 512, 327 P.2d
513 (1958).
24 Richardson v. Railroad Comm'n, 191 Cal. 716, 218 Pac. 418 (1923).
'1
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poration handles its property. If it shows a holding out to the public on
equal terms, that is sufficient."
There seems to be no way to come to the conclusion that the petitioner
dedicated the gas reserves in issue. By refusing to sell to many industries
who had solicited the petitioner for gas and by dealing only with a restricted few, under individual contracts, it in no way showed a willingness
to devote its reserves to the public use. In fact, this is evidence to the
contrary.26
It must be realized that a corporation may do business partly on a
private basis and partly as a public utility. In such circumstances only the
part run as a utility is under the Commission's jurisdiction.2- For even
though a corporation runs partly as a public utility, it can not be compelled
to dedicate all of its business, for that is beyond the police power of the
state."
Effect of Common Carrier Clause
The final contention in Richfield was that the common carrier clause in
the permit showed a dedication of the pipeline by the petitioner, and since
common carriers are one of the defined public utilities,"9 the petitioner
should be under the regulation of the Commission as to the use of the
pipeline.
"A common carrier is one who openly professes to carry for hire the
goods of all who choose to employ him ....
[A] private carrier is one who,
without being engaged in the business generally, undertakes to carry goods
for hire in a particular case." 3° A similar definition was applied in 1951
when the California Supreme Court said that evidence of unequivocal intention to dedicate its property to a public use must be shown before a
carrier's service establishes it as a common carrier .3 It was held that the
common carrier condition in the permit showed evidence of dedication.
However, as to the Richfield situation, the California statutes do not
prevent the operation and use of a pipeline in pursuance of the contract
with Edison even though the petitioner has an obligation to transport gas
to others. 32 "[The petitioner] does not seek to use its pipeline for the common carriage of gas and it may never be called upon to do so ....
[Alt most
it has evidenced a willingness to act as a common carrier when and if it
is called upon to do so."" The principle of California public utility law that
a corporation will not be regulated until it has actually served the public 3"
was followed closely. The Public Utilities Act is not concerned with a cor25 Thayer v. California Dev. Co., 164 Cal. 117, 128 Pac. 21 (1912).
26 Souza v. Public Util. Comm'n, 37 Cal. 2d 539, 233 P.2d 537 (1951).

27 Lamb v. California Water & Tel. Co., 21 Cal. 2d 33, 129 P.2d 371 (1942).
23 Del Mar Water Co. v. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666, 140 Pac. 591 (1914).
29 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 211, 216.
30 1 MOORE, CAMiR s 20 (2d ed. 1914).
31 Samuelson v. Public Util. Comm'n, 36 Cal. 2d 722, 227 P.2d 256 (1951).
32 California Water & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 51 Cal. 2d 478, 334 P.2d 887
(1959).
33 Richfield Oil Corp. v. Public Util. Commn, 54 Cal. 2d

,

,

354 P.2d 4, 17,

6 Cal. Rptr. 548, 561 (1960).
34 California Water & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, supra note 32.

